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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
 Dominick, Louis, Betty, and Mary Ann DeNaples had 
an interest in real estate in Pennsylvania which the state 
condemned as part of the construction of the Lackawanna 
Valley Industrial Highway.  To pay for the land, the state 
agreed to a settlement under which it would pay them $40.9 
million, with interest, in five yearly installments.  During the 
first three years of the agreement, the DeNaples excluded this 
interest from their federal income taxes as tax exempt interest 
under I.R.C. § 103, which permits exclusion of interest 
payments that are obligations of the state.  The IRS issued to 
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each couple a deficiency notice for $2.3 million, which was 
affirmed by the Tax Court.  On appeal, the principal issue is 
whether Section 103 exempts from federal taxation the 
installment interest paid under an agreement that allowed the 
state to make yearly payments.  We hold that it does. 
    
I. 
 
 The facts are not in dispute and were stipulated to 
before the Tax Court.  Dominick DeNaples and Louis 
DeNaples were equal partners in D&L Realty, Rail Realty, 
Inc., F&L Realty, Inc., and Keystone Company.
1
  These 
entities owned an interest in several parcels of real property in 
Pennsylvania.  The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, through 
the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, sought to 
acquire the property to build the Lackawanna Valley 
Industrial Highway.  In 1993 and 1994, to permit construction 
to go forward, the State and the DeNaples entered into two 
Rights of Entry, which permitted the State to enter onto the 
land but did not alter the DeNaples‟ entitlement to just 
compensation.   
 
In 1998, the State initiated condemnation proceedings 
against the properties in the Pennsylvania Court of Common 
Pleas by filing a Declaration of Taking pursuant to former 26 
                                              
1
   Dominick DeNaples is married to Mary Ann 
DeNaples, and Betty DeNaples is married to Louis DeNaples.  
Each couple filed a joint tax return.  For our purposes, they 
are indistinguishable as Dominick and Louis owned equal 
shares in the partnership, reported the same interest income, 
and were issued the same deficiency notice.  When we refer 
to the DeNaples, we refer to them jointly.   
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Pa. Stat. § 1-402(a).  The DeNaples objected, contending that 
the declaration did not adequately describe the property.  The 
court agreed and dismissed some of the suits.  On the 
remaining suits, a jury trial was commenced and then stayed 
when the parties indicated that they had settled. 
 
On November 7, 2001, the parties signed a 
memorandum of intent to settle.  The DeNaples agreed that, 
in exchange for all their ownership interest in all the parcels 
of land, they would received compensation of approximately 
$40.9 million, of which $24.6 million would be allocated to 
principal, and $16.3 million would be allocated to interest 
(“settlement interest”).  There is nothing in the record that 
indicates why these numbers were selected.  
 
A few months later, the parties entered into a formal 
settlement agreement.  The agreement contained an 
integration clause, which held that the agreement was the 
“entire understanding among the parties . . . and supersede[d] 
all prior and contemporaneous agreements and 
understandings.”  JA131.  
 
Because the State lacked sufficient funds available to 
pay the settlement in full, the DeNaples further agreed to 
accept the settlement money in five installment payments.  By 
their agreement, each installment payment would be subject 
to the interest rate set forth in Rule 238(a)(3) of the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs the 
interest rate for tort suits (“installment interest”).2  This 
                                              
2
  The interest rate is “the rate equal to the prime rate as 
listed in the first edition of the Wall Street Journal published 
for each calendar year for which the damages are awarded, 
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interest rate changes every year.  Under the agreement, the 
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas was to retain 
jurisdiction and the DeNaples retained the right to pursue any 
and all remedies should Pennsylvania default.  The settlement 
agreement required that the Court of Common Pleas enter a 
stipulation as an order of the court, and that the State ensure 
the action was marked “settled, discontinued and ended as 
between” the parties.3  JA129.    
 
The State made timely and complete payments under 
the agreement.  In fact, Pennsylvania paid the remainder of 
the amount due in 2005, a full year early.  The DeNaples filed 
income tax returns for tax years 2003 through 2005, and 
excluded from their gross income a portion of the settlement 
interest income and all of the installment interest income they 
had received.  As to the settlement interest income, the 
                                                                                                     
plus one percent, not compounded.”  Pa. R. Civ. P. 238(a)(3) 
(2002). In 2002, the prime interest rate was 4.75%; in 2003, 
the interest rate was 4.25%; in 2004, it was 4.00%; in 2005, it 
was 5.25%; in 2006, it was 7.25%.  Money Rates, Wall St. 
Journal, Jan. 2, 2002; Money Rates, Wall St. Journal, Jan. 2, 
2003; Money Rates, Wall St. Journal, Jan. 2, 2004; Money 
Rates, Wall St. Journal, Jan. 3, 2005; Money Rates, Wall St. 
Journal, Jan. 3, 2006. Thus, the installment interest rate that 
Pennsylvania paid for years 2002 through 2006 were 5.75%, 
5.25%, 5.00%, 6.25%, and 8.25%, respectively.   
 
3
  The record before this Court does not contain a copy 
of the stipulation that the court was to enter.  However, it 
could not modify any provision of the agreement because, 
according to the terms of the agreement, modification 
required the written agreement of both parties.  
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DeNaples received approximately $4.3 million dollars for tax 
years 2002 through 2004 and approximately $8.7 million for 
tax year 2005.  The DeNaples excluded from their federal 
gross income any interest received above 6%, contending that 
anything above this rate was exempt as an obligation of the 
State under Section 103.  As to installment interest, the 
DeNaples received approximately $1.9 million in 2002, $3.8 
million in 2003, $2.2 million in 2004, and $2.7 million in 
2005.  The DeNaples excluded all the installment interest 
income from their gross income calculations as exempt under 
Section 103.  In 2008, the IRS issued deficiency notices to the 
DeNaples.  For each couple, the IRS contended that the 
DeNaples owed an additional $2.3 million dollars in taxes, 
comprised of $714,019 for tax year 2003, $587,257 for tax 
year 2004, and $1,023,299 for tax year 2005.   
 
After the parties stipulated to the facts, the United 
States Tax Court issued a memorandum decision and order 
finding that no part of the settlement interest or the 
installment interest was excludable under Section 103.  
DeNaples v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-171, at *3 (2010).  
As to the settlement interest, the Tax Court concluded that the 
DeNaples had failed to demonstrate that they received interest 
income above and beyond what was legally required and 
therefore the settlement interest was not an obligation of the 
State because it did not invoke the State‟s borrowing 
authority.  See id. at *4.  The Tax Court also determined that 
the parties‟ allocation of the settlement interest was arbitrary 
and thus could not be excluded from gross income.  Id. at *3.  
As to the installment interest, the Tax Court determined that 
none of it was excludable under Section 103 because the 
DeNaples were entitled to it as part of their just compensation 
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requirement.  Id. at *4.  The Tax Court entered an order 
affirming the IRS‟ deficiency calculations in full.  
 
Shortly thereafter, the DeNaples filed a motion for 
reconsideration and a motion to vacate.  Notably, they sought 
to introduce evidence of the prevailing commercial rate to 
show that some of the settlement interest was excludable.  
The Tax Court denied both motions, reaffirming its original 
decision.  It also refused to reopen the record to recompute 
the DeNaples‟ deficiencies.  DeNaples v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo. 2011-46, at *5 (2011).  The Tax Court held that to do 
so would require reopening the proceeding, which was 
inappropriate at that stage.  Id.  The DeNaples filed a timely 
notice of appeal.  
 
II. 
 
The Tax Court had jurisdiction over the dispute 
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 6213(a), 7442.  This Court has 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1).  
Venue is proper in this Circuit because the DeNaples are legal 
residents of Pennsylvania.  26 U.S.C. § 7482(b)(1)(A).   
 
This Court exercises de novo review over the Tax 
Court‟s findings of law, including its construction and 
application of the Internal Revenue Code.  PNC Bancorp, Inc. 
v. Comm’r, 212 F.3d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 2000).  Factual 
findings and inferences drawn therefrom are reviewed for 
clear error.  Id. 
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A.  Installment Interest 
 
We first address whether the interest the DeNaples 
received on each installment payment is excludable from their 
federal income taxes under Section 103 because it is an 
“obligation of a State.”  Section 103 of the Internal Revenue 
Code holds in relevant part: “gross income does not include 
interest on any State or local bond.”  26 U.S.C. § 103(a).  The 
Code defines a “State or local bond” as “an obligation of a 
State or political subdivision thereof.”  Id. § 103(c)(1).  As a 
tax exemption, this provision should be construed narrowly.  
In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Delaware, Inc., 335 F.3d 243, 259 
(3d Cir. 2003) (“As a general rule grants of tax exemptions 
are given a strict interpretation against the assertions of the 
taxpayer and in favor of the taxing power but it is equally true 
that such interpretation may not be so literal and narrow as to 
defeat the exemptions purpose.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
Some form of Section 103 has been a part of the Tax 
Code since the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.  
United States Trust Co. of New York v. Anderson, 65 F.2d 
575, 577 (2d Cir. 1933).  Courts have universally recognized 
that this provision was designed primarily to protect the 
borrowing power of the states.  Id.; see also Stewart v. 
Comm’r, 714 F.2d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 1983) (Stewart I); Drew 
v. United States, 551 F.2d 85, 87 (5th Cir. 1977) (“The 
Supreme Court has made it clear that the purpose of Section 
103 is to encourage loans in aid of governmental borrowing 
power.”); Holley v. United States, 124 F.2d 909, 911 (6th Cir. 
1942).   
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As the Supreme Court has made clear, what constitutes 
an “obligation” under the statute should not be “extended to 
include interest upon indebtedness not incurred under the 
borrowing power.”  Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 
293 U.S. 84, 86-87 (1934).  This holding implicitly 
recognized that the opposite proposition must also be true: 
that an “obligation” of a State does include indebtedness that 
is incurred “under the borrowing power.”  See id.  In 
collecting the cases in this field, the Ninth Circuit 
persuasively reasoned that when a government‟s obligation to 
pay interest arises by operation of law, it does not implicate 
the state‟s borrowing power, as “taxing the recipient of such 
interest does not adversely affect the government‟s ability to 
borrow money.”  Stewart I, 714 F.2d at 981.  Thus, when the 
state pays interest at a fixed rate pursuant to a statutory or 
judicial command, it is plainly not excludable under Section 
103 of the Internal Revenue Code.  On the other hand, when 
the government‟s obligation to pay interest arises out of 
voluntary bargaining, the interest exclusion may play an 
important role in allowing the state to reduce its borrowing 
costs.  This implicates the state‟s borrowing authority and 
may be excludable under Section 103.   
 
With these principles in mind, the first question before 
us is whether Pennsylvania‟s interest obligation arose by 
operation of law or by voluntary bargaining.  Because 
Pennsylvania and the DeNaples negotiated a complete arms-
length settlement of Pennsylvania‟s claims and because the 
DeNaples agreed to a lower, variable interest rate for the 
purpose of extending credit to Pennsylvania, we hold that the 
State‟s obligation arose by voluntary bargaining, not by 
operation of law.   
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We recognize that in most Pennsylvania condemnation 
proceedings, the State‟s obligation to pay interest arises by 
operation of law.  A condemnee is entitled to just 
compensation for the taking, which is defined as the 
difference between the market value of the condemnee‟s 
property interest before and after the taking.  Former 26 Pa. 
Stat. §§ 1-601, 1-602.  If the State delays in making payment, 
a condemnee is entitled to interest.  See former 26 Pa. Stat. § 
1-611.  The rate of interest to which a condemnee is entitled 
is not fixed.  Indeed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
declared the former statute requiring a fixed 6% interest rate 
unconstitutional.  Hughes v. Dep’t. of Transp., 523 A.2d 747, 
753 (1987).  In Hughes, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
joined the majority of other states in holding that “if the 
property owner produces evidence that the six percent rate is 
constitutionally insufficient, he should be entitled to a higher 
rate of return as part of just compensation.”  Id. at 753 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also 
McGaffic v. Redev. Auth. of New Castle, 732 A.2d 663, 670 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (applying the higher prevailing 
commercial rate after finding that the statutory 6% interest 
rate did not provide for adequate compensation); Wasserott v. 
PennDOT, 13 Pa. D. & C.4th 593, 595 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1991) 
(“However, in Hughes . . . the Supreme Court refuted the 
mandatory application of [former 26 Pa. Stat § 1-611]. The 
[Pennsylvania] Supreme Court, in effect, opened the door for 
the trial court to determine whether the [State] Code interest 
rate provides just compensation to the condemnee.”).  The 
prevailing commercial rate is different, and usually higher, 
than the Rule 238 tort rate that the DeNaples and the State 
selected.  See Hagen v. East Pennsboro Twp., 713 A.2d 1187, 
1191 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).  Thus, at the time the 
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DeNaples were negotiating with Pennsylvania, they were 
entitled to either 6% or a higher rate.
4
   
 
When the DeNaples and Pennsylvania sat down at the 
bargaining table to negotiate an arms-length settlement 
agreement, they did so in the shadow of the ongoing 
condemnation proceeding with its attendant rights and 
obligations, including the DeNaples‟ right to interest for any 
payment delay.  However, when they crafted a total and 
complete settlement and the DeNaples agreed to take 
installment payments because the State needed credit, the 
statutory right to interest became nothing more than a 
negotiating chip in the DeNaples‟ pocket.  It could be, as it 
was here, bargained away.  Albrecht v. United States, 329 
U.S. 599, 604 (1947) (when a property owner contracts for 
the sale of their property to the government “rather than to 
have „just compensation,‟ in the constitutional sense, fixed by 
the courts, [a court] must look to those terms for the measure 
of their compensation, including their right to . . . interest.”).  
This transforms the State‟s interest obligation from a 
mandatory one to a voluntary one and, thus, alters the Section 
103 analysis.
5
 
                                              
4
  In 2006, Pennsylvania enacted a new statute whereby 
the interest rate for delay damages is the prime interest rate 
plus 1%.  26 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 713 (2006).   
 
5
  In Stewart II, the Ninth Circuit found whether the 
settlement was entered into because the State needed credit to 
be a material fact that altered the application of Section 103 to 
a condemnation settlement.  Stewart v. United States, 739 
F.2d 411, 414 (9th Cir. 1984).  The Commissioner attempts to 
distinguish this case by pointing out that in Stewart II, 
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Thus, we can no longer say that for this particular 
settlement agreement, the State‟s obligation to pay interest at 
a fixed rate arose by operation of law.  Instead, the State‟s 
obligation to pay interest at the selected rate arose by 
operation of a freely-negotiated contract that contemplated no 
further judicial intervention.  In this context, the parties were 
free to select any rate of interest or none at all.  As it was 
undisputed that the State and the DeNaples entered into the 
installment agreement because the State needed credit, this 
total and complete settlement was voluntary and thus 
implicated the State‟s borrowing authority.    
 
The Commissioner relies heavily on the Sixth Circuit‟s 
decision in Holley v. United States.  This case is not binding 
on us and, in any event, is distinguishable.  In Holley, the city 
was in financial difficulty and needed to defer payment for 
the condemnee‟s property.  Holley, 124 F.2d at 910.  The 
parties fashioned an agreement “providing for the method of 
payment by the city.”  Id.  This settlement agreement became 
                                                                                                     
condemnation proceedings were only threatened while here 
they had been commenced.  This, the Commissioner argues, 
demonstrates that the transfer was obligatory not voluntary. 
While the Government is correct that the DeNaples were 
going to be obligated to sell their property to Pennsylvania, 
the DeNaples had a choice over the terms by which they did 
so, including whether they would receive interest and at what 
rate.  They could have proceeded to judgment and obtained a 
judicially mandated just compensation award with statutory 
interest.  Instead, they voluntary bargained with the State 
because the State needed an extension of credit to pay any 
award.  Thus, the distinction is not dispositive here.   
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“part of the award itself” that was issued by the court when 
the condemnation proceeding was completed.  See id.  The 
DeNaples and Pennsylvania, by contrast, agreed to a total 
settlement which extinguished the condemnation proceeding.  
There is no evidence in the record that any condemnation 
award was ever issued as the settlement agreement makes 
clear the case was “settled, discontinued and ended.”  This is 
critical.  The DeNaples and Pennsylvania created an 
agreement completely separate from the judicial process and 
the constitutional requirement of just compensation, as such 
the parties‟ rights and obligations are defined solely by the 
agreement‟s terms.  See Albrecht, 329 U.S. at 604.  In Holley, 
however, the agreement was folded into a just compensation 
award issued by the court.  Therefore, the court in Holley was 
required by law to award interest as part of its judgment, 
while the DeNaples were free to bargain it away without 
judicial oversight.  
 
In fact, the DeNaples accepted a lower, variable 
interest rate than what they were otherwise entitled to.  The 
DeNaples had the right to interest at a presumptive rate of 6% 
or the prevailing commercial rate, yet agreed to accept a 
lower, variable interest rate.  The State‟s obligation to pay 
this amount of interest did not arise by operation of law as 
there was no statute or judicial decree to pay interest at this 
rate.  Pennsylvania law specifically forbids application of the 
Rule 238 interest rate to eminent domain proceedings.  Pa. R. 
Civ. P. 238(e)(1)(“[Rule 238] shall not apply to . . . eminent 
domain proceedings.” ).  Thus, this rate of interest could only 
apply to this transaction through a private contract, not 
through a condemnation proceeding.    
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Finally, the purpose underlying Section 103 was well 
served in this case.  The State was able to obtain credit
6
 from 
the DeNaples at a lower rate of interest than it otherwise 
might have had to if the condemnation proceeding had been 
completed.  In a condemnation proceeding, a court could have 
imposed a 6% interest rate or the prevailing commercial rate, 
which can be as much as prime plus 3%.  Instead, through its 
negotiations and in part because of the Section 103 exclusion, 
the State was able to borrow money from the DeNaples at a 
lower rate of interest, ultimately aiding the State‟s borrowing 
authority and saving it money.  
 
To be clear, we do not hold that any interest payment 
made pursuant to a voluntary settlement agreement is 
automatically excludable under Section 103.  Rather, it is 
excludable here because, given the nature of how and what 
the parties agreed to in the settlement agreement, it is clear 
that the obligation to pay interest at the Rule 238 rate arose 
not by operation of law but through the voluntary, arms-
length negotiations between the DeNaples and Pennsylvania.   
                                              
6
 By surrendering its property in exchange for a promise of 
future payments, the DeNaples extended credit to 
Pennsylvania.  Credit is the “provision of . . . goods . . . with 
the expectation of future payment.”  Merriam-Webster Online 
Dictionary, available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/credit; see also Pollice v. Nat’l Tax 
Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 412 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he 
definition of „credit,‟ however encompasses . . . [the] right 
granted by a creditor to incur debt and defer its payment. . . 
.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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For these reasons, we hold that the Tax Court erred as 
a matter of law when it held that the DeNaples should have 
included the interest they received on the installment 
payments in their gross income calculation.  We, therefore, 
will reverse the Tax Court‟s decision on this issue.  
 
B. Settlement Interest 
 
 We next determine whether the Tax Court erred when 
it held that none of the settlement interest was excludable 
under Section 103, in part because it refused to reopen the 
record and accept evidence about the prevailing commercial 
loan rate.  We hold that the Tax Court did not.  
 
In their memorandum of understanding, Pennsylvania 
and the DeNaples allocated $26 million to principal and $14 
million to interest, referred to as settlement interest.  This 
interest was meant to compensate the DeNaples for the delay 
between the time of the initial Right to Entry and the signing 
of the settlement agreement.  In their tax returns, the 
DeNaples excluded from their gross income any delay 
interest in excess of 6%, reasoning that the State was only 
required to pay 6% and anything above that was a result of 
the State‟s voluntary bargaining.   
 
In its initial opinion, the Tax Court found that the 
allocation between interest and principal was arbitrary and 
excessive.  DeNaples v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2010-171, at 
*3.  To the Tax Court, it appeared that the parties had 
allocated approximately the same ratio of 39.759 percent of 
the total yearly payment to interest.  Id.  From this, the Court 
held that the DeNaples were not entitled to exclude any 
interest from their gross income under Section 103.  Despite 
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indicating that too much had been allocated to interest, the 
Tax Court, on reconsideration, rejected the DeNaples‟ request 
to recalculate the deficiency pursuant to Tax Court Rule 155.  
It held that to recompute would require the introduction of the 
prevailing commercial rate, which was not in evidence.  T.C. 
Memo. 2011-46 at *5.  Thus, the Tax Court found that the 
DeNaples had failed to meet their burden of proof that the 
deficiency was inaccurate.  Id.  We agree. 
 
Under Tax Court Rule 155, “[w]here the Court has 
filed or stated its opinion determining the issues in a case, it 
may withhold entry of its decision for purposes of permitting 
the parties to submit computations pursuant to the Court‟s 
determination of the issues, showing the correct amount to be 
included in the decision.”  However, this process is not meant 
to provide litigants an opportunity for retrial or 
reconsideration.  I.R.C. Rule 155(c).  Issues considered in a 
Rule 155 proceeding are limited to “purely mathematically 
generated computational items.” Blonien v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo. 2003-308, at *4 (2003) (quoting The Home Group, 
Inc. v. Comm’r, 91 T.C. 265, 269 (1988), aff’d on other 
grounds, 875 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.1989)).  Rule 155 does not 
allow for the introduction of new evidence that was not 
before the Tax Court in the original proceeding.  Paccar, Inc. 
v. Comm’r, 849 F.2d 393, 400 (9th Cir. 1988).  There is no 
new evidence if “the evidence necessary to resolve a dispute 
between parties regarding such computations is already in the 
record or within the scope of the evidence presented in 
support of issues already pleaded.”  Emert v. Comm’r, 249 
F.3d 1130, 1132 (9th Cir. 2001).   
 
Here, there was not sufficient evidence in the record 
from which the Tax Court could calculate the prevailing 
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commercial rate at the time of the settlement agreement.  The 
Tax Court acknowledged that the prevailing commercial rate 
is usually calculated by taking the prime interest rate and 
adding 1 to 3 percent.  DeNaples v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 
2010-171, at *3 n.2 (citing Hagan, 713 A.2d at 1191).  While 
the prime interest rate is easily accessible, it would require the 
Tax Court to reopen the record and introduce new evidence 
regarding what additional interest rate to apply.
7
  Rule 155 
does not allow this.  To allow the parties to introduce new 
evidence under the guise that the Tax Court can take judicial 
notice of it or simply hold the DeNaples responsible for the 
highest possible rate would invite relitigation of the issue. 
This is squarely precluded by the Tax Court‟s rule.  Without 
any evidence of the prevailing commercial rate, the Tax 
Court‟s conclusion that the DeNaples had failed to meet their 
burden of proof is correct.  
  
For these reasons, we hold that the Tax Court did not 
err in refusing to reopen the record and finding that the 
DeNaples had failed to meet their burden. Remand to the Tax 
Court for a recalculation of the deficiency on this basis is 
unwarranted.  Thus, we will affirm the Tax Court‟s 
determination as to settlement interest. 
 
 
 
 
                                              
7
  As the Commissioner argues, recalculation of the 
settlement amount might require further evidence, such as the 
fair market value of the property at the time of taking. While 
we do not necessarily agree, we note that this would only 
bolster our holding.    
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III. 
 
 The Decisions and Orders of the United States Tax 
Court will be affirmed in part and reversed in part.  We will 
remand this matter to the Tax Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
